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managerial book-cooking (a purely inuenceactivity) and the risk of endorsing awed business plans
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1 Introduction
For good or ill, the responsibilities of non-executive directors (henceforth NEDs) have become increasingly
formalised and subject to conformance with stricter governance rules and codes of best practice (e.g., the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the USA and the Combined Code on Corporate Governance in the UK).1 In e¤ect the
institutional environment for corporate governance seems to be rapidly shifting from self-regulation to com-
pulsory compliance. Particularly, corporate nancial reporting and audit committees have been the subject
of much regulatory reform.2 Yet whether or not this new approach to governance policy ultimately promotes
shareholdersvalue remains a subject of ongoing debate in the business press and academic literature alike.
In that connection, it has been argued that sti¤er regulatory pressure could have the adverse e¤ect of requir-
ing corporate boards to spend more of their valuable time fullling statutory mandates (e.g. box-ticking)
instead of pursuing more productive activities. As a result, the necessary balance between managerial ac-
countability and business health may break down (see, e.g., Keasey et al. 2005). Underlying this assertion
is the informal claim that higher workloads prompted by intense scrutiny of the rms internal control and
reporting systems may come at the expense of NEDsvalue-enhancing engagement in corporate strategy. As
the new governance climate gathers pace, it is thus important to formally examine whether the heightened
burden of disclosure requirements and compliance-oriented work, while on the surface understandable, could
in reality have inadvertent side-e¤ects.
It goes without saying that the compliance with stricter nancial reporting standards entails direct costs
for rms (e.g., higher auditing fees). In this paper we contend that other indirect, unrecognised economic
costs may in reality play an equally pivotal role. Specically, public policy changes intended to reduce
the extent of misrepresentation may actually fuel top managements incentive to manipulate the rms
(formal) internal control and reporting system. As a result, aggregate welfare and the long-term value of the
rm may ultimately su¤er.
In reality boards are supposed to full a dual role. On the one hand, non-executives have a clear
monitoring mandate to oversee/supervise the performance of senior management. To do so, they rely to a
large extent on nancial statements under the assumption that the accounts provide a true and fair picture
of the rm. In addition, and often overlooked, boards spend certain amount of time discussing the critical
strategic issues the rm is facing. This dialogue not only enables NEDs to give their advice and share
their expert knowledge with top management, but gives board members a much deeper insight into the
1To an appreciable extent, the stampede to alter corporate governance and reporting requirements was a reaction to high-
prole business failures and abuses of executive power on both sides of the Atlantic (e.g., Enron and WorldCom in the US;
Parmalat and Ahold in Europe).
2For example, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have recently
approved new corporate governance rules and standards relating to the work of audit committees (see SR-NYSE-2002-33 and
SEC-33-8220, respectively).
major business challenges faced by the rm. In this way NEDs get deeply involved in the key processes of
formulating and evaluating corporate strategy. Briey put, non-executive directors exert both auditing e¤ort
and strategic involvement e¤ort (i.e. engagement in the business) when performing their duties.
The trouble is, these two major surveillance devices or oversight responsibilities are substitutes meth-
ods of gauging management quality even though they need not compete directly for NEDstime and attention.
Hence, when boards focus on the rms internal control and accounting system they become semi-detached
from strategy their business acumen falters. Top executives are then judged primarily on the basis of -
nancial metrics as opposed to long-term t. As the balance sheet review carries more weight in the boards
decision-making process, the return to managerial book-cooking (a purely inuenceactivity) and the risk
of endorsing awed business plans swell. This conrms a burgeoning sentiment among business leaders and
scholars that boards should perhaps pay less rather than more heed to codied, veriable goodgovernance
principles. This is because the continual strengthening of NEDsauditing and accounting obligations may
weaken rather than strengthen the boards capacity to gauge the quality of management.
Our conceptual framework comprises NEDs and a top management team, personied as the chief executive
o¢ cer (CEO). To highlight our main contribution, we completely abstract from executive reward issues and
monetary incentives. Further, we shy away from productive e¤ort by management. There exists a burgeoning
literature that looks at compensation-driven earnings manipulation, but our interest lies instead in the
connected question of how the drain of code compliance a¤ects managerial incentives to cook the books
the so-called aggressive accounting. To our knowledge, the plausible link between regulatory compliance
with tighter reporting obligations and managements incentive for nancial misreporting remains by and
large unexplored.
The interest of non-executives is assumed to be perfectly aligned with that of the shareholders. There does
exist a basic conict of interest between NEDs and management, however, because the CEO wishes to hold
a tight grip on her position and hamper value-enhancing replacement. To counter the underlying problem
of asymmetric information, non-executives assess executive performance in two di¤erent ways: auditing
the nancial information produced by senior management, and being engaged in the companys strategy
denition and implementation. NEDsauditing e¤ort produces veriable hardevidence of the veracity of
the companys nancial statement whereas NEDsinvolvement in strategy permits a sound judgement of the
business plan pursued by management.3 With these surveillance mechanisms we attempt to resemble the
observed boards role of monitoring short-term nancial performance and appraising longer-term business
initiatives possibly the two major responsibilities of NEDs apart from setting remuneration policies.
To highlight in a stark way the gist of our analysis, we assume that the CEO only exerts unobservable
3As we explain in the next section, an audit of the accounts is performed by an external auditor who never fails to act in
the interest of the board. Hence no incentive problems arise at the audit level.
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book-cookinge¤ort. This activity brings no benet to the company; its sole objective is to conceal weak
performance through inuencing the auditing procedures e¤ectiveness. Therefore, book-cooking could be
interpreted as time spent trying to inuence the composition of the audit committee, or exploiting loopholes
in the rms accounting system, or eliciting cooperation along reporting lines so as to achieve a workable
misreporting scheme.4 Its sole objective is to make an audit failure more likely.
In this context, our main contention is that allegedly goodgovernance principles such as progressively
more stringent auditing obligations may in fact fuel unproductive book-cooking e¤ort by top management.
That is, stricter formalisedcontrol can have the paradoxical e¤ect of weakening e¤ectivecontrol within
organisations.
We show that even though the two surveillance devices do not make competing demands for NEDstime
and attention because there is no interaction in the private cost function, raising auditing e¤ort above the
optimal level to comply with legal requirements results not only in less strategic involvement by non-executive
board members (i.e. less e¤ort expended in developing and overseeing the corporate strategy), but equally
important in a higher amount of managements inuence activity. As a result, the long-term value of the
business may ultimately su¤er. This basic result is consistent with existing arguments suggesting a potential
negative impact of excessive compliance regulation on shareholderswealth. For instance, the majority of
chairmen from FTSE 100 companies surveyed by Russell Reynolds Associates during 2005 did not believe
increasingly burdensome governance regulation have had a positive impact on company performance.5 The
reasoning provided in this paper is more subtle, though: the compliance with tighter audit compliance
reduces the attractiveness of strategic involvement, so less of it takes place in a constrained equilibrium
where board members use more intensely the relatively less e¢ cient monitoring technology.
Our model also captures the notion that the strategic focus of the boards role is essential for long-term
value, and code compliance should be developed in a carefully crafted way.6 If boards allow the latter to
dominate, it can have the unintended consequence of destroying value.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the basic ingredients of our analytical framework.
Section 3 considers a simplied version of our model in which non-executive board members can only choose
the rms audit intensity in order to evaluate management performance. Proposition 1 formalises one of
the main messages of this paper a higher probability of audit could actually induce more book-cooking
activity by top management. Section 4 then proceeds to examine a richer milieu where NEDs can also
choose the level of engagement in corporate strategy so as to competently assess executive t. Proposition 4
4 In our particular context, the inuence activity could be managerial time or attention devoted to devising subterfuges to
exploit the exibility of generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) and generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
5The Chairmans Report, Russell Reynolds Associates, November 2005.
6A similar sort of recommendation has been put forward by Roberts and Young (2005) in their report on The Role of the
Board in Creating a High Performance Organisation.
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shows that in this context tighter auditing obligations not only fuel managerial book-cooking, but also stie
non-executivesunderstanding and shaping of the companys business plan. Hence nancial review of top
management substitutes for their operating/executive review.
2 Setup and timing
Consider a group of non-executive board members (henceforth B), whose interest is perfectly aligned with
that of the shareholders, and a top management team (henceforth M). For simplicity, assume that M
stands for the chief executive o¢ cer (CEO) and that shareholders have perfectly congruent objectives to
maximise the companys net returns. The company has nancial resources accumulated in previous periods
whereas M lacks wealth and is protected by limited liability. The latter will ensure that management cannot
be contractually induced to report truthfully (of which more later). All agents are assumed risk neutral and,
to keep things simple, we dispense with discounting.
Our model comprises three periods, indexed t = 0; 1; 2: This is depicted in Figure 1. Roughly speaking,
in the rst period, t = 0; the board appoints a CEO to delineate and implement a strategy or business plan.
Implementation of the envisaged strategy is a risky business because there is chance that it fails owing to
exogenous factors (maybe a technological shift in the market in which the rm operates dooms its business
model to failure). After learning the outcome of implementation in the second period, t = 1, M may attempt
to report inated earnings so as to show good managerial performance and hamper her replacement. After
observing the nancial statement produced by M, board members choose two surveillancemechanisms:
audit intensity and engagement in strategy. These monitoring technologies attempt to reect two major
oversight responsibilities of NEDs, namely, accounting/nancial and operating/business review of senior
management. At the beginning of the last period, t = 2; B makes a replacement decision based on the
outcome of the monitoring process. The long-term value of the business plan is then realised and all parties
collect their respective payo¤s. The details of each period are further explained below.
As it will become more clear shortly, in our model all e¤ort choices entail social losses because they are
costly for the agent involved but do not enhance allocative e¢ ciency. This is not too restrictive because
this paper abstracts from welfare analysis, although there are several ways in which we could extend our
conceptual framework so as to bring welfare implications to the fore. See the Conclusion for more on this
important issue.
2.1 Appointment
In period t = 0; B appoints a CEO from a large pool of potential managers. The job of the CEO is to
delineate a business plan (or strategy statement) and carry out its implementation in period t = 1. The
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t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
M is appointed. State of the world is
realised: “high”or “low”
interim earnings.
M reports earnings and
the parties exert effort.
Managerial evaluation
and value-enhancing
replacement.
Parties collect long-
term payoffs.
Figure 1: Sequence of events.
appointed CEO does her best to successfully implement the envisaged corporate strategy and yet the state
of nature ultimately determines this outcome. We model this as a random variable  that can take only two
values, S in case of success and F in case of failure. Think of  as the CEOs long-term suitability to the
job, e.g., her cultural t or leadership prowess. Alternatively but equivalently,  could be interpreted as the
ultimate soundness of the managers visionof the likely evolution of the market in which the rm operates.
At the outset, neither party knows the value of  although there is a common belief that with probability pi
state i 2 fS; Fg will occur, with pi > 0 and pS + pF = 1: As all parties agree on the same prior at the time
the CEO is hired, no adverse selection problem arises at this stage.7
Let  denote the proportion of potential executives who behave selshly and always maximise expected
utility. If the need arises, these managers will be willing to cook the books to gain an advantage. (1  )
stands in turn for the proportion of ethicalmanagers, who under no circumstances would rig accounting
gures or commit fraud. These managers always report truthfully irrespective of their personal interest in
the nal outcome. The characteristic of a manager is unobservable to B.
To highlight our main point, we abstract from issues of incentives (i.e. productive e¤ort) and executive
rewards: Ms next best alternative is normalised to zero and she works for the rm so long as her salary
7 In Rotemberg and Saloner (2000), CEOs are also born with a visionof what is best for the rm although in their case the
strategic direction is biased: the CEOs favoured business strategy di¤ers from the one that maximises prots. In our model
there is no bias ex ante. Besides, Rotemberg and Saloner focus on organisational behaviours that are completely di¤erent from
the ones that are to the fore in this paper.
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is non-negative. In this way we disentangle misreporting from compensation packages and bring under
harsh spotlight the di¤erence between our approach and prior contributions that stress the link between
earnings manipulation and performance-based pay (see, e.g., Goldman and Slezak (2005) and Bergstresser
and Philippon (2006)). In those papers the incentive to manipulate earnings stems from the fact that
managements compensation or tenure depends on earnings-driven performance measures. In our model,
however, M values her position because she collects an unobservable private benet b > 0 if she is retained
in period t = 2 (more on this shortly). Think of b as perks, corporate funds diverted to senior management
or pension payout that M collect if they stay up to liquidation. While Ms compensation package plays
no role in our analysis, it is not di¢ cult to ponder extensions in which socially valuable e¤ort and e¢ cient
contracting are taken on board. We leave this for a sequel, though.
2.2 Implementation and reporting
The details of periods t = 1 and t = 2 are depicted in Figure 2. At the beginning of period t = 1; the
realisation of  becomes private information to M after all, the CEO deals with the rms processes and
operations on a day-to-day basis. In addition, the business generates interim earnings: Eh > 0 (high) if
 = S and El = 0 (low) if  = F . All this is common knowledge. At this point board members only access
a report on actual earnings, E^j = Ej j 2 fh; lg ; produced by M. For expositional reasons, we call E^ the
rms nancial statement albeit more general interpretations are also possible (E^ could be, for example, a
management earnings forecast or a formal estimate of oil/gas reserves).
To evaluate managerial incentives to misreport earnings, we must consider what would happen if M
truthfully reported low earnings. As it will become clear shortly, in our model shareholders will always be
better o¤ replacing non-performing management. This makes our analysis non-trivial by creating a conict
of interest between B and M. Particularly, when  = F selsh management will produce dodgy accounts
in order to secure a tighter grip on b.
Anticipating this behaviour, NEDs rely on two surveillance devices to catch non-performing management:
auditing e¤ortand involvement in strategy. The former represents the extent to which reported earnings
are publicly scrutinised. Specically, members of the audit committee choose A 2 [0; 1] at a cost A2=2: This
verication scheme enables B to execute an independent audit of reported earnings with probability A. The
audit intensity should be interpreted broadly: it could be the soundness of the rms nancial reporting and
disclosure mechanisms, the degree to which the rm abides by auditing procedures and accounting techniques
enshrined in Acts and Codes, or the strictness of the formal internal and external control system.8 In what
8 In the interpretation we have in mind, A may also be viewed as the extent to which board members are in a position to
exercise a knowledgeable judgement on accounting and reporting issues, or on non-traditional accounting techniques used by
the top management.
7
Period t = 1 Period t = 2
M learns
state of
nature
M reports
earnings
M and B
choose
effort levels
Financial
and
business
oversight
Replacement
decision
Liquidation
Figure 2: Sequence of events
follows, we refer to A as the boards audit policy.
When an audit is executed, it reveals real earnings with probability 1   (C) but does not challenge re-
ported earnings with the complementary probability, where C  0 represents (unobservable) book-cooking
e¤ort exerted by M at private cost C2=2: Think of C as time spent unproductively trying to inuence the
composition of the audit committee, or exploiting loopholes in the rms accounting system, or eliciting
cooperation along reporting lines so as to achieve workable misreporting. C is, in e¤ect, an inuence activity
that brings no benet whatsoever to the organisation (see Milgrom and Roberts (1988)).9 In our setup, the
source of inuence is Ms capability to interfere in the e¤ectiveness of the audit policy. Following Newman
et al. (1996, 2005), we make the following assumption regarding the non-detection probability, .
Assumption 1 (C) = 1  e C :
Hence, as the level of managerial book-cooking approaches 0, the probability of a¤ecting the e¤ectiveness
of the rms control system also goes to 0. As C approaches innity, however, the manager a¤ects the
e¤ectiveness of the audit process with probability 1:10 The audit of reported earnings is assumed to be free,
9 In our context, the inuence activity could be managerial time or attention devoted to devising subterfuges to exploit the
exibility allowed in generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
10 It is widely recognised that there are limits to auditors ability to detect accounting fraud, especially when it involves
collusive behaviour among executives and acquiescence along reporting lines.
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impartial and veriable in court - this essentially brushes away additional moral hazard issues in the auditing
technology that are immaterial to our story. No audit failure penalty is imposed on the auditor in case the
accounting fraud is discovered in later (unmodelled) periods.
The other surveillance mechanism used by B, engagement in strategy, captures the extent to which non-
executive board members can produce a sound judgement of the rms business model. Specically, NEDs
choose S 2 [0; 1] at a cost S2=2: This operating auditenables board members to learn  with probability
S: Thus, information-acquisition investment S can be viewed as time or attention devoted by B to assessing
corporate strategy, or acquiring/sharpening an expert knowledge of the business, or monitoring stringently
the initiatives proposed by senior management. In what follows, we refer to S as the boards involvement or
engagement in corporate strategy.
2.3 Managerial replacement and long-term payo¤s
At the beginning of period t = 2; non-executives observe the outcome of monitoring and decide whether or
not to replace M. Subsequently the business project is liquidated. M is red in three possible circumstances:
(1) when low earnings are reported, (2) when B challenge the veracity of the nancial statement, and (3)
when B learn . As a result, only ethical managers truthfully report low earnings.
More particularly, if M is replaced before the project is liquidated, then all parties get 0 (gross of
investment costs).11 We assume that in this case the CEO just retires and faces no stigma whatsoever
there are no economic or moral penalties for false reporting. In the absence of managerial replacement, the
rms (net) incremental liquidation proceeds are S =    b > 0 in case of successful implementation and
F =  b otherwise. These terminal values are neither veriable nor subject to managerial manipulation,
what seems realistic if the long run (represented by period t = 2) is far enough in the future so as to make
contracting infeasible. Note that b reduces the total payout to the owners upon liquidation. Hence,  may
be interpreted as the discounted value of the future stream of benets generated by a successful business
plan or the long-term market value of the company under competent management.12
11The underlying logic is that a di¤erent set of CEOs capabilities is needed to reorganise or redeploy the organisations assets
after awed implementation of the envisaged strategy.
12Alternatively but equivalently, our model could be built upon the assumption that the CEO intially chooses between two
unveriable projects, A and B say: both yield b to the CEO, whereas project A yields  > 0 to the shareholders and project B
yields  b: Thus, as in Burkart et al. (1997), there exists a conict of interest between the manager and the shareholders but
non-executives cannot distinguish between the projects without further action.
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3 A simple case
As a rst step, in this opening section we dispense with S and x attention on the other two endogenous
variables of our model: managements book-cooking activity, C, and NEDsaudit policy, A.13 This yardstick
case will enable us to isolate basic mechanisms at work in a relatively simple environment. Later, once these
e¤ects are better understood, we move on to examine a richer and more realistic setting in which NEDs
involvement in strategy also plays a role.
Figure 3 depicts the game tree; for simplicity, the parties payo¤s have been omitted. The rst two
nodes are chance moves that determine the type of manager hired and the outcome of the implementation,
respectively. The incumbent CEO, who is privy to all this information, then produces a nancial report
E^j (denoted by h; l) and subsequently the board chooses an audit policy (denoted by a; n). As usual, the
dotted line represents an information set, so these nodes are indistinguishable to non-executive members
of the board. Due to the absence of enforceable penalties for misreporting, a non-ethical CEO who faces
unsuccessful implementation will be willing to perpetrate accounting fraud because in the worst-case scenario
she is caught sacked. As we show below, the amount of managerial book cooking generally depends on
Bs audit policy. A su¢ ciently high ne for breaching nancial reporting obligations may deter M from
misreporting, of course, albeit this situation does not seem to accord with reality.
To simplify notation, let pS = p and pF = 1   p: Since non-executives cannot distinguish between an
honest and a dishonest CEO, they use the veracity of accounting gures as an imperfect proxy of managerial
performance. Particularly, the gains from auditing depend on the distribution of sincere and insincere
managers among all those who report high earnings. To be more concrete, consider the case of an unsuccessful
manager who ddles with the accounts in order to secure a tighter grip on her position. Calling  the
probability attached to the event that a CEO who reports high earnings actually disguises low earnings, a
straightforward application of Bayeslaw implies that
Pr

 = F j E^ = Eh

  =  (1  p)
p+  (1  p) (3.1)
Using Figure 3, it is readily seen that (3:1) represents the probability of being in the middle node given
that NEDs know they are at their information set. E¤ectively, the probability that a manager reports
ctitious high earnings is  (1  p) because honest or successful managers never misreport. This explains
the numerator of (3:1) : As to the denominator, note that a manager reports high earnings in two possible
situations: when there is sound implementation of the envisaged strategy (which occurs with probability p) or
when there is awed implementation and M uses deceitful accounting to pump up performance (which occurs
13The rms probability of audit, or auditing intensity, can be interpreted as internal control systems and governance mech-
anisms, as mandates originated in an external regulatory agency responsible for enforcing nancial reporting obligations, or as
a combination of both. We shall come back to this issue later, when we deal with corporate governance rules.
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The “book-cooking”game. Exogenous chance moves are denoted by squares.
Figure 3: Game tree.
with probability  (1  p)). This explains the denominator of (3:1). Observe that  = p (1  p) =2 > 0
and p =  =2 < 0; where subscripts stand for partial derivatives and  = p+ (1  p). Not surprisingly,
the probability that high earnings are actually fabricated decreases with the proportion of ethical managers
in the whole population and increases with the di¢ culty of successful implementation.
Following Graetz et al. (1986), Melumad and Mookherjee (1989) and Khalil (1997), among others, we
posit that B cannot commit themselves to an audit strategy in advance. Auditing has to be sequentially
optimal because it is in the boards best interest to decide whom to audit only after nancial disclosure
takes place (i.e., in a properly dened continuation subgame).14 Hence a strategy for the board is simply
the likelihood of auditing the accounts of a manager who reports high earnings, since there is no point in
auditing a manager who (truthfully) reports low earnings. Note that, as opposed to the literature on tax
compliance, in our model the incentive to audit does not stem from the collection of a penalty but rather from
the opportunity to replace non-performing management. In this way shareholders avoid losing b. Therefore,
given C, in period t = 1 non-executives select an audit policy so as to maximise the rms expected payo¤:
	 = A f [(1  ) 0  b] + (1  )g+ (1 A) f b+ (1  )g  A2=2
14As mentioned in Section 2, we assume throughout that the rms cost of actually carrying out an audit of the accounting
gures is zero. If, quite realistically, we had assumed instead that the auditing procedure entails costs, then a time-consistency
problem would have arised and the possibility to commit to an audit policy would have been even more questionable.
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The rst term is the expected gain from auditing high earnings, taking into consideration managements
book-cooking activity, whereas the second term gives the rms expected revenue when no audit takes place.
Re-arranging, we have that
	 =  (1  )  b [1 A (1  )] A2=2
In words, the rst term in this expression represents the certain revenue that accrues to the company if
no audit is performed. The other two terms capture the expected return from an inspection, net of audit
expenditures (the ex post gain from an audit of high accounting earnings is b). Expression A (1  ) ; the
e¤ectivenessof the audit policy chosen by the board, lies at the centre of our approach and will resurface
repeatedly throughout this paper.
Using the FOC, we have that Bs optimal amount of audit resource investment is given by
A = b (1  ) = b (1  p) (1  )
p+  (1  p) (3.2)
Thus, other things being equal, the probability of audit increases with (a) the amount of corporate
funds diverted by management (e.g., perks), and (b) the proportion of non-ethical managers in the whole
population. On the other hand, the marginal benet of auditing decreases with (a) the probability of
successful implementation, and (b) the amount of book-cooking e¤ort exerted by management.15
Next, consider the problem faced by senior management who behave so as to maximise expected utility.
Confronted with awed implementation of the envisaged strategy, this sort of CEO will overstate true
performance in an e¤ort to keep her job. As mentioned above, this is partly because we abstracted from
penalties for managerial wrongdoings. Therefore, given a probability of audit A, an unethical manager
chooses C so as to maximise
B = A [(1  ) 0 + b] + (1 A) b  C2=2
After basic algebraic manipulations, the above expression can be re-written as follows:
B = b [1 A (1  )]  C2=2
This simply says that in the presence of awed implementation, the incumbent CEO contrives to collect b
when beefed-up accounting gures are not challenged during an audit process, which occurs with probability
[1 A (1  )] : Thus, the FOC for the manager yields
C = bA0 (3.3)
15 If NEDs could commit to and audit strategy at the outset, it would be the solution to the following programme:
max
fAg
p  b (1  p) [1 A (1  )] A2=2
which gives rise to the FOC Ac = b (1  p) (1  ) 6= A: This vindicates our previous claim that the probability of audit chosen
by the board in period t = 0 is not generally subgame-perfect or sequentially optimal.
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where 0 stands for @=@C = e C : Interestingly, the boards audit policy creates an incentive problem: the
time or e¤ort expended by M to achieve a workable misreporting scheme, C, actually increaseswith A.
This provocative conclusion stems from the fact that a higher probability of audit, rather than discouraging
managerial fraud, actually boosts the return to Ms book-cooking activity. As non-executives rely more
heavily on accounting gures to judge management performance, the marginal return to Ms inuence on
the rms formal control system swells. The simple reason is that the accounting chicanery is more likely to
inuence the boards replacement decision.
Based on the best-response functions (3:2) and (3:3) ; we can calculate the Nash equilibrium conguration.
In that connection, the following assumptions ensure that feasible solutions always obtain.
Assumption 2 0 < b  1:
When the above assumption holds and managerial value diversion is not too large, we have that 0 
A  1:
The next proposition records one of the main conclusion of this section.
Proposition 1 Management book-cooking (inuence) activity, C, is non-decreasing in the audit intensity
A: In the presence of interior solutions, C strictly increases with A:
Proof. The result follows directly from (3:2) ; (3:3) and Assumption 2.
Paradoxically, a higher audit intensity induces top management to spend larger amounts of (unproductive)
time and attention trying to inuence the rms control systems. Accounting-led boards fuel managerial
book cooking because NEDs provide non-performing managers with an opportunity to inuence the rms
formal decision-making process. Underlying this conclusion is a basic informational asymmetry. Specically,
non-executives do not have all the information needed to make a good decision on replacement whereas
management has both the required information and an interest in the nal outcome. In this context, a
higher probability of audit boosts Ms incentive to spend resources on book cooking in order to turn the
boards decision to her advantage.
The following comparative-static result formally records how changes in the underlying parameters of
the model a¤ect the equilibrium values of the two endogenous variables. The subsequent discussion provides
intuitive explanations for these ndings.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, we have that
1. @A=@ > 0 and @C=@ > 0;
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2. @A=@p < 0 and @C=@p < 0;
3. @A=@b > 0 and @C=@b > 0:
Proof. See Appendix.
An increase in the proportion of ethical managers, 1   ; is benecial because B and M expend fewer
valuable resources on accounting-related activities. Since high reported earnings are less likely to have
been articially inated, B audits less intensively which in turn discourages management book cooking. An
upward shift in p moves the endogenous variables in a similar direction: when this probability increases, it is
less likely that a CEO who informs high earnings is actually misreporting. In consequence, NEDs have less
incentive to scrutinise management through auditing and the marginal return to managerial book-cooking
plummets. As to the personal benet collected by the manager, b, its e¤ect is similar to an increase in :
the benet from an audit as well as the marginal return to book-cooking each go up with b.
As to public policy implications for corporate governance legislation, suppose we impose the constraint
A  A on this basic model. This case might arise, for example, when the intensity of corporate auditing
is subject to external governance regulations. In the presence of an additional restriction, it is evident that
the company cannot do better than without it. More precisely, if the constraint on the audit probability
is non-binding then, of course, the equilibrium conguration is exactly as described above. If A < A,
however, the board would like to audit less than the legally enforceable level required by corporate reporting
requirements. It is worth stressing that the higher probability of audit is actually dysfunctional because
it induces management to spend more of their time inuencing the rms formal surveillance process. In
consequence, society as a whole is unambiguously worse o¤.
Given this negative result, it is important to briey discuss other possible ways to hinder fraudulent
and/or unethical behaviour by senior management. According to 2, greater transparency of disclosure
could also be achieved having more ethical managers. In the longer term at least, 1    is sensitive to
governmental intervention such as content of executive education programmes (e.g., business ethics or CSR)
and more general social policies. Another way of improving the informativeness of corporate reporting
entails enhancing the e¢ cacy of audit. In e¤ect much of recent corporate governance legislation is aimed
at improving the quality of corporate nancial statements. To tackle this issue, suppose the non-detection
probability takes the form  (C) = 1   e C ; where  2 [0; 1] captures the productivity of managerial
book-cooking. Our previous results refer to the case in which  = 1. As  approaches 0, however, the
manager becomes relatively less e¤ective in inuencing the probability with which accounting tricks are
uncovered during an audit. Intuition might suggest that as  becomes smaller, the amount of book-cooking
activity also slumps. Yet the following proposition shows that this need not necessarily be the case.
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Proposition 3 Suppose that  (C) = 1  e C : In equilibrium, we have that @A=@ < 0 and @C=@ ? 0:
Proof. From (3:2)  (3:3) ; we obtain:
24 1  bAcc  bc
bc 1
3524 dC
dA
35 =
24 bAcd
 bd
35
where subscripts stand for partial derivatives. Let D > 0 be the determinant of the rst matrix on the l.h.s.
of this expression. Then, straightforward applications of Cramers rule and the Implicit Function Theorem
imply that
@C=@ =
bAc   b2c
D
=
b2e 2C (1  2C)
D
? 0
and
@A=@ =
  [1  bAcc] b   b2Acc
D
< 0
Hence the probability of audit and the amount of inuence activity may sometimes increase as ; the
productivity of managerial book-cooking, decreases. The logic behind this surprising result is the following.
A fall in  gives rise to two opposite e¤ects on the return to C: For one thing, the marginal unit of book-
cooking e¤ort becomes less attractive and management has an incentive to cut it. This reects a direct
impact of  on C: For another thing, board members respond to a drop in  by increasing the probability of
audit, which in turn boosts the marginal benet from book-cooking. As it turns out, when  is relatively high
the latter (indirect) e¤ect may dominate and a small reduction in  provokes increases in both endogenous
variables. In such circumstances, the e¤ectiveness of the auditing procedure su¤ers even though managerial
book cooking becomes relatively less productive.
4 The model
In this section we convey the whole gist of our analysis by allowing non-executive board members to also
choose the extent of their engagement in the strategic direction of the company. Recall that the choice
variable S 2 [0; 1] enables members of the board to correctly assess the quality of implementation with
probability S. The cost of NEDsinvolvement in strategy is S2=2:
Four possible situations may arise in this setup. First, if the business model performs well and earnings
are positive, then the incumbent CEO is retained. For successful managers always report truthfully. Second,
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if the business model performs badly and board members are strategically knowledgeable, then manager-
ial replacement ensues irrespective of reported earnings. On these occasions M may inate earnings, but
this is inconsequential because non-executivesbusiness knowledge enables them to replace non-performing
management. The third and fourth cases refer in turn to situations in which there is awed implementation
but NEDs cannot directly assess corporate strategy. In such circumstances some managers will perpetrate
fraud in an attempt to avert accountability and non-executivesdecision-making process will depend entirely
on the outcome of the balance sheet review. Hence, with probability 1    the accounting subterfuge is
uncovered and the manager is red, whereas with probability  the trick is not detected and non-executives
endorse du¤ business plans - an instance of a type-II error.16 The latter represents the risk of business
failurefaced by ill-equipped i.e. poorly-informed NEDs.
A crucial thing to notice is that presently the probability attached to the event that board members
cannot use their business knowledge to spot a awed implementation of the corporate strategy is given by
(in this case high reported earnings disguise poor performance):
Pr

 = F j E^ = Eh

 ^ =  (1  p) (1  S)
p+  (1  p) (4.1)
Hence ^ =  (1  S) : The numerator stems from the fact that a manager who reports ctitious high
earnings cannot be directly assessed by the board ex post with probability  (1  p) (1 S); because ethical
managers pay no heed to their pecuniary interest and always report truthfully. As to the denominator, note
that management report high earnings either when there is sound implementation of the business plan (which
happens with probability p) or when there is awed implementation and deceitful accounting is used (which
happens with probability  (1  p)): The intuition behind (4:1) can also be grasped with the help of Figure
4, where y (respectively, n) means the board can (respectively, cannot) directly assess the implementation
outcome. When NEDs reach their information set, the expected gains from auditing hinge on the likelihood
that the board cannot gauge the quality of management by other means. In these circumstances and audit
carries all the weight in the boards decision-making process. To obtain (4:1), note that the probability of
being in the node on the right-hand side of the middle (dotted) box is  (1  p) (1  S) while the probability
of being at the information set is p +  (1  p) : Not surprisingly, we have that ^S =   < 0. Within this
richer framework, the conditional probability that fabricated earnings are detected exclusively during an
audit decreases with NEDsstrategic involvement - both surveillance devices are substitutes.
The aforementioned implies that, given C, in period t = 1 non-executives choose A so as to maximise
the expected net benet from an audit:
	^ =  (1  )  b (1  S) [1 A (1  )] A2=2
16Alternatively,  could be viewed as the probability of reporting high earnings when the manager actually generates low
earnings. In this interpretation, the CEOs choice variable is  rather than C:
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Figure 4: Game tree with strategic involvement.
In the case under consideration an audit of the accounts matters only when non-executives cannot directly
asses the quality of strategy implementation. As a result, the optimal amount of audit resource investment
comes down to
A^ = b^ (1  ) = b (1  p) (1  S) (1  )
p+  (1  p) (4.2)
Equation (4:2) conrms our previous assertion that, other things being equal, the boards surveillance
mechanisms are substitutes at the margin. Namely, the relative attractiveness of an independent audit
decreases with the level of NEDsinvolvement in strategy. As we shall see, the boards business initiative is
also a superior monitoring technology because it mutes managements incentive to engage in book-cooking
inuence activities.
Consider the problem faced by a CEO who acts in her best personal monetary interest. In the presence
of sound implementation, the manager does not need to fabricate earnings to show favourable results. Hence
C = 0 in this case. In the presence of poor implementation, and given S and A, the manager chooses C so
as to maximise her expected utility:
B^ = b f(1  S) [1 A (1  )]g   C2=2
E¤ectively, in case of business failure management divert b to themselves only if NEDs cannot judge the
soundness of the business plan and beefed-up accounts are not challenged during the audit process. All this
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happens with probability (1  S) [1 A (1  )] : Thus, the managers FOC yields
C^ = b (1  S)A0 (4.3)
As C stands for Ms unproductive e¤ort or resources expended in trying to achieve a workable misreporting
scheme, (4:3) says that managements inuence on the companys formal control system decreases with NEDs
involvement in strategy. This is because, as opposed to the simpler case examined in the previous section, in
the presence of strategy-led boards the accounting chicanery is less likely to impinge on NEDsreplacement
decision. Thus the marginal return to Ms book-cooking activity plunges. Conversely put, boards semi-
detached from strategy rely more heavily on performance metrics based on reported earnings, which in turn
boosts the return to Ms inuence activity. The rms risk of business failure thus soars.
The next intermediate result follows directly from (4:2)  (4:3) :
Lemma 1 Both A^ and C^ decrease with non-executivesengagement in strategy, S:
Proof. It proves convenient to start with C. Specically, di¤erentiate totally (4:3) to obtain
dC
h
1 + 2 (b0)2  (1  S)
i
=  2 (b0)2 dS
which implies that
@C
@S
=   2 (b
0)2 
1 + 2 (b0)2  (1  S) < 0:
As to A; note that the total di¤erential of (4:2) gives rise to the following expression
dA = b

S (1  )  0
@C
@S

dS
Since (1  ) = 0 and  =  S (1  S) ; the absolute value of the rst term is greater than the absolute
value of the second term. Hence @A=@S < 0:
The last ingredient of our analysis is given by the boards optimal choice of S. Given C, in period t = 1
non-executives choose S so as to maximise the expected value of the rm. Namely;
^ = S f0 + (1  )g+ (1  S) f(1  )   b [1 A (1  )]g   S2=2
where  is given by (3:1) because high earnings are reported by the incumbent. The above expression comes
down to
^ =  (1  )  b (1  S) [1 A (1  )]  S2=2 (4.4)
The intuition for this equation is the following. With probability (1  ) ; reported high earnings are
not falsied and shareholders collect long-term benets . With probability  [S + (1  S)A (1  )] ; there
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is awed implementation but the incumbent CEO is replaced owing to successful strategy/operational or
accounting/nancial oversight by the board. In either case shareholders obtain zero. Finally, with probability
 (1  S) [1 A (1  )] shareholders lose b because the manager fabricates earnings and the accounting trick
remains undetected (i.e., the audit is ine¤ective or never takes place). The FOC is thus given by
S^ = b [1 A (1  )] (4.5)
Equation (4:5) conrms that, other things being equal, both surveillance mechanisms are substitutes:
the marginal return to Bs strategic involvement decreases with the probability of audit. Hence auditing-led
boards may get divorced from strategy, which can be detrimental for the health of the business. Interestingly
enough, this occurs even though the two scrutiny devices do not directly compete for board memberstime
or attention - they are neither complements nor substitutes in the NEDs personal cost function. While
business-led boards have the capacity to spot awed strategies more e¤ectively, the extra e¤ort only pays o¤
if the accounting trick doesnt pop up during the audit of the accounts. Consequently, heightened auditing
pressure and tighter formal control systems may ultimately discourage NEDsstrategic thinking.
The rst-order conditions (4:2)  (4:5) imply that:17
A^ =
b (1  ) (1  b)
1  [b (1  )]2 (4.6)
C^ = 
(
b (1  ) (1  b)
1  [b (1  )]2
)2
=

A^
2
= (4.7)
S^ =
b
h
1  b (1  )2
i
1  [b (1  )]2 (4.8)
Some basic features of the above equilibrium conguration are worth pointing out. First, we have that
A^ < S^: Underlying this result is the supposition that boards strategic engagement is a relatively more
e¤ective surveillance device because it does not attract managerial inuence activity. The ip side, of course,
is that the boards expert knowledge is much more di¢ cult to verify and eventually enforce in court. Had
we assumed a conict of interest between non-executives and shareholders (e.g., moral hazard), the latter
could have found it convenient to put more weight on a veriable probability of audit in order to promote
management accountability. In this way, the extent of monitoring performed by board members can be
better enforced. The fact that A^ is bounded away from zero is also interesting. The absence of a corner
solution is obviously an artifact of our assumption concerning cost functions. What seems more important
though is the idea that both scrutiny mechanisms entail costs and companies might not nd it optimal to
completely avoid the one that gives rise to inuence activities. Even though non-executives may suspect
that senior executives are distorting the nancial information they produce, wiping out Ms book-cooking
17Notice that second-order conditions automatically hold.
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inuence activity can be prohibitively costly for rms (as much as completely eradicating tax fraud or crime
can in fact be detrimental for society as a whole).
Equations (4:6)  (4:8) characterise interior solutions when non-executives face no constraint whatsoever
in their optimal choice of endogenous variables. In the next section, however, we turn to policy implications
of our analysis. Particularly, we interpret the probability of audit A as a variable inuenced by a regulatory
agency concerned with the extent of misrepresentation and responsible for enforcing nancial disclosure
rules (e.g., the FSA, LSE or SEC). Alternatively, this compliance obligation could stem from reporting
requirements imposed by formalised codes of best practice (e.g., the UK Combined Code or the US Sarbanes-
Oxley Act). In any case, what really matters is that the prevailing corporate governance climate in the rms
environment imposes a mandatory level of auditing intensity NEDs must comply with.
4.1 The e¤ect of tighter compliance mandates
Consider a situation in which A  A owing to a shift in the institutional environment for corporate governance
that sets an enforceable minimum level of audit intensity. Particularly, let us focus on the case where
A^ < A the regulatory constraint is binding in equilibrium. In this context, it seems natural to think of A
as stringent governance mandates the Audit Committee of the board of directors must comply with. Then,
as in the simpler construct of Section 3, equation (4:3) implies that the level of book-cooking e¤ort spent
by the rms senior management rises. This is because the marginal return to the CEO inuence activity
goes up. Yet, an additional e¤ect arises which is that board members also alter their level of engagement
in the strategic direction of the company. This is evident from (4:5) : Less clear is the exact direction of
the change in NEDsstrategic involvement, though, because while the probability of an audit increases, its
actual e¤ectivenessA (1  ) need not do so.
In that connection, the next comparative-static result formally records the equilibrium responses of
Bs involvement in strategy and Ms book-cooking activity to an exogenous regulatory reform that sets a
(binding) lower bound on A.
Proposition 4 When non-executive directors must comply with the requirement A  A > A^, we have that:
1. Non-executivesstrategic engagement plummets, i.e. S < S^:
2. Senior managements book-cooking inuence activity goes up, i.e. C > C^:
Proof. Compute the total di¤erential of (4:3)  (4:5) to obtain:24 1  bA0
bA0 1  b (1  S)A00
3524 dS
dC
35 =
24  b (1  ) dA
b (1  S)0dA
35 (4.9)
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Let  > 0 be the determinant of the rst matrix on the l.h.s. of this expression. Then, straightforward
applications of Cramers rule and the Implicit Function Theorem imply that
@S
@A =
 b(1 ) b2(1 S)A(1 )2+b2(1 S)A(1 )2
 =
 b(1 )
 < 0:
@C
@A =
b(1 S)0+b2A(1 )2
 > 0:
The result for @S=@A used the fact that 00 (1  ) =   (1  )2 (see Assumption 1).
As NEDs devote more time and attention to comply with nancial reporting and auditing obligations,
the incentive to focus on strategy plunges even though the two activities do not directly compete for board
membersattention. In consequence, an escalation of nancial reporting requirements intended to prevent
corporate fraud may, paradoxically, end up boosting managements attempt to inuence the rms formal
control systems.18 The reason for this is that compliance intensity and strategic focus are substitutes at
the margin: the benet from an extra unit of strategic engagement decreases with the probability of audit.
Thus compliance-led boards get divorced from strategy, which may disturb the necessary balance between
management accountability and business health.
To see this, consider the relation between net equity value and Bs focus on accounting and auditing
matters. Taking the derivative of (4:4) w.r.t. A yields
@^
@A
= fb [1 A (1  )]  Sg @S
@A
  b (1  S)A0 @C
@A
+ b (1  S) (1  )
This shows that compliance has costs and benets in terms of rms long-term performance. For one thing,
the rst two terms in the above equation are negative because @S=@A < 0 and @C=@A > 0. As the auditing
intensity increases, NEDsunderstanding of the business falters and boards face a higher business risk of
endorsing awed strategies. This diversion e¤ect is detrimental because NEDs concentrate resources on
the relatively less e¢ cient surveillance mechanism. Also, stricter compliance fuels managerial cook-booking
activity which in turn diminishes the e¤ectiveness of the auditing procedure. Stricter nominal accountability
may weaken e¤ective accountability. For another thing, the last term is positive and reects the fact that
balance sheet reviews do increase the accountability of non-performing managers. The net long-term value
of the company is non-monotonic in the probability of audit and it optimal value is characterised by (4:2).
Thus, an upward shift in A owing to corporate governance laws renders the substitute surveillance tech-
nology less attractive and NEDs strategic focus su¤ers. Since the manager is in turn more likely to be judged
by short-term nancial gures, she devotes more attention to (socially wasteful) book-cooking activities. So
18Goldman and Slezak (2005) also nd that certain regulatory changes intended to hamper the fraudulent manipulation of
accounting gures can actually fuel misrepresentation. The mechanism at work in their model is completely distinct, though,
because it revolves around managerial incentives to manipulate earnings as a result of more intense performance-based pay.
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long as there exist states in which non-executives lack su¢ cient knowledge to evaluate managements long-
term business plan, an exogenous increase in the probability of audit actually fuelsmisreporting activities.
The reason being that performance metrics based on short-term earnings are more likely to inuence Bs
evaluation of the managers long-term t to the company.
Our model gives rise to the following testable predictions.
Proposition 5 When the constraint A  A is binding in equilibrium, we have the following comparative
statics:
1. Expected book-cooking, C; goes up;
2. The probability that a report will be audited, [p+ (1  p)]A, goes up;
3. CEO turnover,  (1  p) [S + (1  S)A (1  )] ; could go either up or down.
When board members must comply with a binding probability of audit, the comparative statics of our
model are rather di¤erent from the ones identied in the previous section. Formally;
Proposition 6 Suppose the constraint A  A is binding before and after changes in the exogenous variables.
Then, we have that:
1. @S=@ > 0 and @C=@ < 0;
2. @S=@p < 0 and @C=@p > 0;
3. @S=@b > 0 and @C=@b ? 0:
Proof. See Appendix.
When owing to corporate governance reforms the board audits with higher probability than it would
otherwise like, non-executives only alter S as a response to changes in the exogenous variables. This in turn
impinges on the optimal level of book-cooking e¤ort exerted by management. For example, an increase in
the proportion of strategic managers induces more strategic involvement by board members which ultimately
discourages managements inuence activity. Notice that this conclusion stands in stark contrast to the result
obtained in our simple model of Section 3, where more ethical management was always valuable. Likewise,
an increase in the likelihood of successful implementation renders executive evaluation less attractive as a
surveillance device. As a result, the amount of inuence activity goes up. Finally, an upward shift in b
induces more strategic engagement by the board whereas the impact on C is generally ambiguous. In e¤ect
when S is relatively high an increase in b discourages managements inuence activity while the opposite
happens when S is relatively small.
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5 Concluding remarks
The above results follow from on a number of simplifying modelling assumptions. As always, some are more
critical than others. Of particular importance is the absence of credible penalties for managerial misreporting.
While somehow restrictive, we do not think this assumption is totally unrealistic. For the major insights
of this paper would still obtain had we assumed a positive but nite penalty for false reporting. Further,
business cases indicate that often it is di¢ cult and costly to prove top executivesinvolvement in accounting
fraud in a court due to lax span of accountability along reporting lines. Lower-level managers, who more
often than not need to give their consent and carry out the actual alteration of accounting entries, are held
responsible for nancial fraud but are not necessarily the ones who promote and mainly benet from the
accounting ruse.
Managerial productive e¤ort could also be taken on board without necessarily a¤ecting any of our
central predictions. In fact, if M could also take productive actions that increase the probability of sound
implementation (i.e., actions that promote shareholdersvalue), the unrecognised costs of compulsory code
compliance might become larger than the ones identied in this paper. The logic is that more audit intensity
induces diversion of managerial resources from productive to inuence activities, which may be detrimental
for both shareholders and society as a whole.
The assumption that NEDs strategic involvement does not in itself create a corresponding inuence
activity or e¢ ciency cost for the rm is also debatable. Su¢ ce to say, though, that this need not change
our message that stricter nancial disclosure obligations fuel managerial book-cooking activities. The main
point of departure from the above analysis would be the additional trade-o¤s taking place, because in the
case under consideration the board will not necessarily rely so heavily on its strategic engagement to assess
senior management.
In our model managerial book-cooking e¤ort is socially costly insofar as it entails a utility cost for senior
management. In reality, these activities could also carry explicit opportunity costs for the rm such as the
diversion of valuable physical resources from more productive uses (see, e.g., Goldman and Slezak, 2005). For
example, management may be induced to abandon projects that are NPV positive or to cut R&D spending
or expenditures fundamental to running successfully other business lines. To the extent that corporate
resources are also diverted from protable uses in the book-cooking process, the private and social costs of
earnings management exceeds the one identied here.
If anything, our model suggests that compliance with enforceable best practice guidelines may be very
costly for shareholders. E¤ectively, stricter nancial disclosure requirements may ultimately hamper the
performance of the rm. However it is not di¢ cult to ponder plausible scenarios in which increased nancial
reporting regulation could still bring social gains. For example, an independent and veriable audit might
enable e¢ cient trade with an outsider (a corporate raider) that otherwise would not take place. Alternatively,
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if there is moral hazard at the board level and NEDsengagement in the business remains unobservable, a
veriable audit might be a feasible way to enforce management accountability. When shareholders su¤er
from a collective action problem a policy intervention might boost e¢ ciency.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. Compute the total di¤erential of (3:2)  (3:3) to obtain:24 1  bA00  b0
b0 1
3524 dC
dA
35 =
24 0 d+ 0 dp+A0db
b (1  )d+ b (1  )pdp+  (1  ) db
35
Let D > 0 be the determinant of the rst matrix on the l.h.s. of this expression. Then, straightforward
applications of Cramers rule and the Implicit Function Theorem imply that
@C
@ =
b20(1 )
D > 0:
@A
@ =
[1 bA00]b(1 )
D > 0:
@C
@p =
b20(1 )p
D < 0:
@A
@p =
[1 bA00]b(1 )p
D < 0:
@C
@b =
A0+b0(1 )
D > 0:
@A
@b =
[1 bA00](1 ) bA(0)2
D =
(1 )
D > 0:
The results for @A=@p and @A=@b stem from the fact that 00 (1  ) =   (0)2 (using Assumption 1).
Proof of Proposition 6. To examine how a change in  a¤ects the equilibrium values of S and C,
notice that 24 1  bA0
bA0 1  b (1  S)A00
3524 dS
dC
35 =
24 b [1 A (1  )] d
0
35
It is readily seen that @S=@ > 0 and @C=@ < 0: As to a change in p; we have that24 1  bA0
bA0 1  b (1  S)A00
3524 dS
dC
35 =
24 bp [1 A (1  )] dp
0
35
Hence @S=@p < 0 and @C=@p > 0: Finally, observe that24 1  bA0
bA0 1  b (1  S)A00
3524 dS
dC
35 =
24  [1 A (1  )] db
(1  S)A0db
35
This expression implies that @S=@b > 0 and @C=@b = A0 (1  2S) ? 0:
25
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